Some of us have been holding the Met to account for longer than we would like to admit. Having been put on the previous Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) by Ken Livingstone when he was the Mayor of London, l saw the Met Police at close quarters during the 7th of July bombings of London and the shooting of jean Charles de Menezes. 

“Purdah,” now officially referred to as the pre-election period of sensitivity, applies to senior officers in local and regional government—including Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and their staff—between the announcement of an election (or notice of election) and the final result. For May 2026 elections, this period for local authorities in England generally runs from 16 April to 7 May 2026.

Here is how it applies to senior officials:

1. General Principles for Senior OfficersPolitical Impartiality: Senior officers (e.g., Chief Executives, Monitoring Officers) must remain strictly neutral, ensuring public resources are not used to support any party or candidate.

Publicity Restrictions: Officers must avoid publishing, or assisting in publishing, material that could influence voters. This includes press releases, newsletters, websites, and social media posts featuring quotes or photos of candidates (including sitting councilors seeking re-election).

Handling Contentious Issues: Officers should, where possible, delay decisions or public announcements on controversial or highly sensitive issues until after the election.

Politically Restricted Posts: Officers in politically restricted posts must not take part in political campaigns or canvassing.

2. Application to Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)PCCs are unique because they are both executive office holders and often politicians.

Separation of Roles: PCCs must strictly separate their role as an incumbent seeking re-election (or supporting a candidate) from their official capacity.

Use of Resources: Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) resources, branding, or staff must not be used for campaigning.

Publicity & Photos: PCCs should avoid using force staff, uniform personnel, or police equipment in publicity photos related to campaigns.

Official Duties: While continuing essential duties to maintain public safety, PCCs must be cautious about appearing with other candidates at “official” events.

Information Usage: PCCs cannot use privileged or non-public information obtained through their office to support campaign efforts.

3. Key Restrictions on ActivitiesEvents/Visits: Officers should avoid organising events with candidates, particularly if the event could be seen as boosting a candidate’s profile.

Social Media: Council/PCC social media accounts should be used for operational, factual information only, and not to promote candidates or political viewpoints.

“Business as Usual”: Normal service delivery continues, and official communications that are purely factual and non-political are allowed.Advice: If officers are uncertain, they should seek advice from the Monitoring Officer.

4. Consequences of BreachWhile pre-election rules are largely based on convention rather than statute for national politicians, local authorities are bound by the Code of Recommended Practice on Local Authority Publicity, and breaches can lead to legal challenges for “misconduct in public office” or violation of the Local Government Act 1986

Having notice another water leak along the roads of the City of Westminster in Paddington, l reported the leak to ThamesWater  from one of their assets by social media. It made me wonder about how many road works are caused by them on our streets, so l put in a FOI request to the Council to find out for myself. 

From the request response, it appears that ThamesWater have been closing the roads over 2,200 times annually in the City of Westminster for a number of years, probably the single most important London borough for road to get around Central London.  These road closures don’t just cause grief to local residents but road vehicles users on the streets of London and tourist! You have thought that after so many years of managing these water assets under our roads, the level of closures would come down particularly when the old pipes are replaced with plastic ones. But alas but with Thames Water in Central London! 

I have of course raised issues about Thames Water and their road works a few times on my blog page, noting their performance and fines as well, we a clear pattern of neglect showing. 

With the demise of AMT Coffee stall in Marylebone Railway Station as the hut has been knocked down, have we seen the demise of this once ethical company once and for all? 

AMT Coffee was founded in 1993 by Alistair McCallum-Toppin and his two brothers Angus and Allan. AMT Coffee is a chain of coffeehouses that are located in hospitals and railway stations. The stall remains a functional, high-volume operator catering to commuters and travellers.  It was certainly the first at Marylebone Railway Station serving all the commuters before Starbucks Coffee,Petit Pret & Greggs came along. The chain is notable for being one of the first in the UK to use 100% fair trade coffee and organic milk.

AMT Coffee was the first national coffee company in the UK to use 100% bio-compostable cups and lids, 100% fairtrade coffee and 100% organic milk, as well as the first to be accredited with the Fair Tax Mark. In March 2011, Ethical Consumer named it the most ethical coffee chain. 

In November 2022, AMT was bought out of administration by SSP Group.The process was finalised in February 2025 when the AMT Coffee Ltd would be dissolved on Companies House.

So could others coffee addicts of their other 14 stalls, tell us if those other ones are still running at all? 

Many thanks. 

While Bangladesh is no longer the “basket case” of the 1970s and has made strides in food self-sufficiency, a Hormuz-linked crisis would transform a maritime blockade into a domestic rural emergency by choking the energy inputs required to grow the nation’s staple food.

The potential impact on Bangladesh of a food crisis stemming from a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is multifaceted, echoing the structural vulnerabilities seen during the 1943 Bengal famine while operating within a modern, interconnected economy.

1. The Energy-Food Nexus: The Boro Rice Threat

Unlike the 1943 famine, which was largely driven by failures in the monsoon-dependent Aman rice crop and colonial distribution failures, modern Bangladesh relies heavily on the Boro rice season, which accounts for nearly 60% of total production.

• Irrigation Vulnerability: Boro rice is entirely dependent on diesel-powered irrigation and electricity. Because Bangladesh imports nearly 90% of its energy—much of it refined petroleum and LNG that passes through or originates near the Strait of Hormuz—a prolonged blockade would cause fuel prices to skyrocket.
• Fertilizer Costs: Around 30% of global fertilizer trade and significant LNG (a key feedstock for urea) pass through the Strait. A disruption would lead to a “fertilizer shock,” making it too expensive for small-scale farmers to maintain high yields, potentially leading to a domestic “food availability decline” (FAD).

2. Parallels to the 1943 Bengal Famine

The 1943 famine, which killed an estimated 3 million people, provides a historical warning about how external shocks can spiral into mass starvation through “entitlement failure”—a concept pioneered by economist Amartya Sen.

• Market Hoarding and Speculation: In 1943, the fear of shortage caused by the loss of Burmese rice imports led to massive hoarding and price gouging. In a modern context, news of a Hormuz blockade could trigger similar panic-buying and “war-time inflation,” where food exists but becomes unaffordable for the urban poor and landless laborers.
• Wartime Displacement of Resources: Just as the British colonial administration prioritized military supplies over civilian food in 1943, a modern crisis might see the government forced to prioritize limited foreign exchange reserves for fuel and debt servicing over food subsidies, leaving the most vulnerable populations at risk.

3. Modern Economic Constraints

Bangladesh today faces pressures that did not exist in 1943, particularly regarding its integration into global finance:

• Foreign Exchange Crisis: Bangladesh’s “fiscal space” is already strained by post-pandemic recovery and the Russia-Ukraine war. A $10 rise in oil prices per barrel can increase annual import costs by $1.5–$2 billion.
• Supply Chain Resilience: While Bangladesh has better infrastructure today than in 1943, its reliance on a single geographical “chokepoint” for energy makes its entire agricultural system brittle.

A comparison to the 1974 famine is arguably more relevant to the “Hormuz scenario” than 1943, because 1943 was a colonial crisis, while 1974 was a crisis of sovereignty, foreign exchange, and global geopolitics—the exact same pressures Bangladesh would face today.

While 1943 showed the danger of administrative apathy, 1974 provides a blueprint for how a modern state can be strangled by external economic shocks.

1. The “Foreign Exchange” Trap (The Dollar Crisis)

In 1974, Bangladesh had food in the fields, but it lacked the foreign exchange (Forex) to import grain during a shortage.

• 1974 Parallel: The government’s ability to import food commercially was exhausted because Forex reserves were depleted. This was exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis, which tripled the cost of fuel and fertilizer imports.
• Hormuz Context: A blockade would send oil prices to record highs. Bangladesh would be forced to choose between spending its dwindling dollars on LNG/Fuel (to keep the lights on and factories running) or Food. Just like in 1974, a lack of “liquidity” on the global stage could lead to a domestic supply vacuum.

2. Food as a Geopolitical Weapon (The “Cuba” Factor)

One of the most tragic aspects of 1974 was the U.S. food aid embargo.

• 1974 Parallel: The U.S. withheld food aid (under PL-480) because Bangladesh was exporting jute to Cuba, violating U.S. trade sanctions. By the time Bangladesh stopped the exports and the U.S. released the aid, it was too late to prevent mass starvation.
• Hormuz Context: In a post-Hormuz world, global food and energy markets would become hyper-politicised. Bangladesh might find its food security tied to its diplomatic alignment. If it seeks help from one “bloc” (e.g., China or India), it may face pressure or “aid conditionality” from another, mirroring the 1974 scenario where a sovereign trade decision resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe.

3. The “Anti-Famine Social Contract”

The 1974 famine was a turning point that created what scholars call an “anti-famine social contract” in Bangladesh.

• The Result: Since 1974, every Bangladeshi government has known that its political legitimacy depends on keeping the price of rice stable. The 1974 famine directly led to the fall of the post-independence government’s popularity and the eventual rise of military rule.
• Hormuz Context: A Hormuz crisis wouldn’t just be a “food problem”; it would be a stability problem. The government would likely deploy every resource—including potentially “printing money” or taking high-interest loans—to prevent a 1974-style price spike, as they know the alternative is political collapse.

The 1974 famine proved that being self-sufficient in “production” isn’t enough. Even if Bangladesh grows enough rice, if the global price of energy makes it impossible to transport that rice or if a lack of dollars prevents the import of wheat to bridge a small gap, the system fails.

A Hormuz blockade would recreate the 1974 “perfect storm”: High global prices + Depleted reserves + Diplomatic pressure.

In a recent report of the FT “Iran demands crypto fees for ships passing Hormuz during ceasefire”, April 8 it highlighted a pivotal moment in the erosion of the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege.” Tehran’s demand for tolls in bitcoin—reportedly $1 per barrel for passage through the Strait of Hormuz—is not merely a desperate evasion of sanctions, but a calculated strike against what has long been termed monetary imperialism.


By mandating that tolls be settled in digital assets within a matter of seconds, the Iranian authorities are effectively bypassing the T+2 settlement cycles of the Western banking system. This “seconds rule” ensures that transactions are finalised on the blockchain before the US Treasury or OFAC can intervene. It is a functional demonstration of how decentralised finance can turn the “financial iron curtain” of sanctions into a porous screen.


However, the broader implications for global trade are sobering. With several hundred tankers currently idling in the Persian Gulf—a veritable “car park” of energy—the friction between established petrodollar protocols and this nascent “petrocrypto” reality is manifest. Shipping companies now face a dilemma: adhere to Western compliance and remain stranded, or facilitate Tehran’s digital pivot and risk the ire of Washington.

Furthermore, this shift signals a move toward a multi-polar financial order where oil is no longer tethered solely to the greenback. If other sanctioned or “dollar-agnostic” states follow suit, we may look back at this bottleneck in the Strait as the moment the petrodollar’s hegemony began its final descent. The era where the US could weaponise the global clearing system may be reaching its technical limit.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz (which began on March 4, 2026) has triggered what the IEA calls the “greatest global energy security challenge in history.” For a city like London, this crisis has transformed the shift from a petrostate (fossil-fuel dependent) to an electrostate (electricity and renewables-led) from a long-term climate goal into an immediate survival strategy.

As of April 2026, London is accelerating this transition through several specific levers:

1. Hardening the Grid for “Electrification-First”

With Brent Crude surging past $120 per barrel and Qatari LNG exports stranded, London is pivoting to protect its power supply from global price shocks.

• Great British Energy (GBE): The recently established publicly owned company is fast-tracking investments in offshore wind and grid storage to decouple London’s electricity prices from the volatile international gas market.
• Strategic Storage: Unlike oil, which is currently “stranded” in the Gulf, London is investing in large-scale battery storage and “Vehicle-to-Grid” (V2G) trials. This allows the city to use the batteries of thousands of EVs parked in London to stabilize the grid during peak demand.

2. Transitioning the Transport “Lifeline”

The crisis has caused acute jet fuel and diesel shortages, leading to flight cancellations and high shipping surcharges.

• EV Infrastructure Surge: To bypass the “petrol pump” crisis, London has accelerated the rollout of ultra-rapid charging hubs. The goal is to make the city’s logistics and transit entirely independent of Hormuz-sourced oil.
• The “Zero Carbon Accelerator”: The Mayor’s office has redirected emergency funds to this initiative to speed up the electrification of London’s bus fleet and delivery vans, ensuring essential services remain functional even if fuel reserves run dry.

3. Decoupling Heating from Gas

A harsh 2025–2026 winter left gas storage at only 30% capacity just as the Strait closed. London is now treating gas boilers as a national security risk.

• Heat Pump Subsidies: The “Home Upgrade Grant” and “Warmer Homes” programs have seen a massive influx of funding to move Londoners away from gas boilers toward electric heat pumps.
• District Heating: Plans for waste-to-energy and large-scale heat networks are being fast-tracked in central London boroughs to provide communal, non-fossil-fuel heating.

4. Economic Pivot: The “Electrostate” Financial Hub

London is positioning itself as the global capital for Transition Finance.

• Innovation Zero 2026: This major summit in London is currently focusing on “Resilient Supply Chains,” specifically securing the critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, copper) needed for an electrostate.
• Green Bonds: The City of London is seeing record issuance of green bonds to fund the “Clean Power by 2030” mission, effectively moving capital away from traditional “petro” investments that are currently locked in geopolitical turmoil.

Comparison of the Two Models (2026 Crisis Context)

While the immediate impact of the closure is painful—with inflation rising and jet fuel rationing—London’s policy response in 2026 suggests that this “oil reckoning” is acting as a catalyst to permanently sever ties with the old petrostate architecture.

Janan Ganesh’s recent analysis, “How the World Learned to Love the Bomb,” offers a sobering look at our current nuclear reality. However, his assessment overlooks the robust, though admittedly strained, global treaties and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) that continue to provide a critical counterbalance to proliferation.

While the nuclear landscape is increasingly volatile, we should not ignore the following “disarmament infrastructure”:

The NPT’s Near-Universality: As of early 2026, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) maintains 191 state parties. Despite the absence of India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan, and North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal, it remains the cornerstone of global stability.

A Denuclearized Southern Hemisphere: Regional exclusion zones—including the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk—now ban the possession and testing of nuclear weapons across 56% of the Earth’s land area. These zones encompass 60% of UN member states, effectively “locking out” nuclear arms from vast portions of the globe.

Evolving Norms: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has gained momentum, with 74 states ratifying the ban as of late 2025. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has established a near-universal norm against explosions, with 178 ratifications to date

While the reinstatement of the NewSTART agreement between the US and Russia is an urgent necessity, we must acknowledge that the world has not simply “learned to love” the bomb. Rather, a significant majority of the international community continues to build the legal and regional frameworks necessary to resist it.

The air breathed in Dhaka has never been a more urgent priority. With the new government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman taking office following the interim administration of Dr Muhammad Yunus, there is a unique window of opportunity to pivot from reactive measures to a sustained, aggressive strategy against the city’s choking smog.

Dhaka’s air quality frequently ranks as the worst in the world, with AQI levels often soaring into the “hazardous” category. While seasonal changes play a role, the structural causes — unregulated construction, brick kilns, and archaic transport systems — require more than just rhetoric; they require immediate short and medium-term interventions.

Short-term interventions

The most critical immediate step for the new administration is the enforcement of existing environmental laws. 

For too long, “pollution permits” have been unofficially granted through bureaucratic apathy. The government must immediately implement a “polluter pays” principle. 

The Department of Environment (DoE) needs the teeth to shut down illegal brick kilns that ring the capital. These kilns are responsible for nearly 58% of Dhaka’s fine particulate matter (PM2.5) during the dry season. 

A temporary moratorium on traditional brick production in the Greater Dhaka area, incentivising a shift to hollow blocks and green bricks, could yield visible results within months.

Next, the “dust-fest” caused by haphazard construction must end. The new government should mandate that all construction sites — both public and private — be fully shrouded.

Road-digging by utility services must be coordinated to ensure that half-finished projects aren’t left to dry and blow into the lungs of commuters. 

Water spraying on major arterial roads during peak dry hours should be a standard municipal duty, not an occasional luxury.

Medium-term structural shifts

The interim government initiated some progress toward a unified public transport system; the Rahman administration must now accelerate this. 

Dhaka’s reliance on thousands of dilapidated, black-smoke-spewing buses is a public health catastrophe. The transition to a unified bus franchise system is essential. 

By replacing the current chaotic competition between private operators with a streamlined, regulated fleet — ideally moving toward electric or CNG-run vehicles — the city can significantly reduce vehicular emissions.

Furthermore, the expansion of the Metro Rail (MRT) network remains the most viable long-term solution to decongesting the streets and cleaning the air.

Waste management is another medium-term battleground. The open burning of municipal waste at landfills releases toxic dioxins into the atmosphere. Investing in “waste-to-energy” plants and banning the open-air incineration of plastics and electronic waste will prevent these toxins from entering the capital’s air shed.

It is also important to note also that a lot of Dhaka’s pollution is “transboundary,” meaning it drifts in from the wider Indo-Gangetic Plain (India and Pakistan). 

Medium-term success will require regional cooperation to manage this shared air corridor. For this, it desperately needs an initiative through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc).

While most initiatives have so far been voluntary, focusing more on data sharing and monitoring rather than enforcing binding emission targets is needed now for all.

A new political will

Air pollution is not just an environmental issue; it is an economic and health crisis. It costs Bangladesh billions in lost productivity and healthcare expenses annually. 

The new government has been handed a mandate for change. By prioritizing breathable air, they aren’t just protecting the environment — they are protecting the very lives of the citizens who put them in power.

The technology and the policy frameworks already exist. What has been missing is the consistent political will to put public health over the interests of the “brick and transport” lobbies.

If the new government can successfully clear the skies of Dhaka, it will be the most visible sign of a truly new era for Bangladesh.

Printed in the Dhaka Tribune today  https://www.dhakatribune.com/amp/opinion/op-ed/406575/what-can-the-government-do-to-address-air

The current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, as analysed in the FT and by organisations like the FAO and IFPRI, presents a “systemic shock” to agri food systems that mirrors the structural vulnerabilities seen during the 1943 and 1974 Bengal famines. While those historical famines were driven by wartime inflation and supply chain collapses, the present risk stems from the Strait’s role as the world’s primary “fertiliser and energy artery.”

The primary risks identified in the FT “Big Read” analysis and related reports include:

1. The Fertiliser “Double Whammy”

Unlike 1943, where the failure was largely administrative and logistical, a modern famine risk in South Asia is tied to chemical inputs.

• Production Halt: The Gulf region accounts for 30% of global nitrogen fertiliser trade and 45% of sulfur exports (essential for phosphate fertilisers). A blockade halts these shipments during the critical March/April planting season.

• Cost Surge: Middle East urea prices jumped nearly 20% in a single week. For farmers in Bangladesh and India, these costs can make planting the “Boro” (winter) rice crop—which is currently underway—prohibitively expensive or impossible.

2. Geographic Vulnerability (The “Bengal” Factor)

The FAO specifically identifies Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka as the most vulnerable.

• Import Dependency: These nations rely on the Strait for both finished fertilisers and the natural gas required to run domestic fertilizer plants. India has already had to scale back domestic production to 70% capacity due to fuel shortages.

• Yield Collapse: If the disruption persists for more than three months, a “yield shock” is predicted. In 1974, floods triggered the famine, but in 2026, the trigger is a man-made “input drought” that could lead to a massive drop in rice and wheat harvests.

3. Energy-Induced Food Inflation

The “Big Read” piece highlights that food security is now inseparable from energy security.

• Fuel for Irrigation: High oil prices (up 15% since the conflict began) increase the cost of diesel, which powers the water pumps essential for rice cultivation in the Bengal delta.

• Logistics: With 70,000 tons of food aid already stuck and shipping costs rising by up to 25%, the price of “getting food to the plate” is skyrocketing

The FT analysis rightly warns that while global food stocks are currently “sufficient,” the crisis is a race against time. If the blockade lasts through the 2026 planting cycle, the transition from a “price crisis” to a “supply famine” becomes a mathematical certainty for import-dependent nations in South Asia.