While Bangladesh is no longer the “basket case” of the 1970s and has made strides in food self-sufficiency, a Hormuz-linked crisis would transform a maritime blockade into a domestic rural emergency by choking the energy inputs required to grow the nation’s staple food.
The potential impact on Bangladesh of a food crisis stemming from a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is multifaceted, echoing the structural vulnerabilities seen during the 1943 Bengal famine while operating within a modern, interconnected economy.
1. The Energy-Food Nexus: The Boro Rice Threat
Unlike the 1943 famine, which was largely driven by failures in the monsoon-dependent Aman rice crop and colonial distribution failures, modern Bangladesh relies heavily on the Boro rice season, which accounts for nearly 60% of total production.
- Irrigation Vulnerability: Boro rice is entirely dependent on diesel-powered irrigation and electricity. Because Bangladesh imports nearly 90% of its energy—much of it refined petroleum and LNG that passes through or originates near the Strait of Hormuz—a prolonged blockade would cause fuel prices to skyrocket.
- Fertilizer Costs: Around 30% of global fertilizer trade and significant LNG (a key feedstock for urea) pass through the Strait. A disruption would lead to a “fertilizer shock,” making it too expensive for small-scale farmers to maintain high yields, potentially leading to a domestic “food availability decline” (FAD).
2. Parallels to the 1943 Bengal Famine
The 1943 famine, which killed an estimated 3 million people, provides a historical warning about how external shocks can spiral into mass starvation through “entitlement failure”—a concept pioneered by economist Amartya Sen.
- Market Hoarding and Speculation: In 1943, the fear of shortage caused by the loss of Burmese rice imports led to massive hoarding and price gouging. In a modern context, news of a Hormuz blockade could trigger similar panic-buying and “war-time inflation,” where food exists but becomes unaffordable for the urban poor and landless laborers.
- Wartime Displacement of Resources: Just as the British colonial administration prioritized military supplies over civilian food in 1943, a modern crisis might see the government forced to prioritize limited foreign exchange reserves for fuel and debt servicing over food subsidies, leaving the most vulnerable populations at risk.
3. Modern Economic Constraints
Bangladesh today faces pressures that did not exist in 1943, particularly regarding its integration into global finance:
- Foreign Exchange Crisis: Bangladesh’s “fiscal space” is already strained by post-pandemic recovery and the Russia-Ukraine war. A $10 rise in oil prices per barrel can increase annual import costs by $1.5–$2 billion.
- Supply Chain Resilience: While Bangladesh has better infrastructure today than in 1943, its reliance on a single geographical “chokepoint” for energy makes its entire agricultural system brittle.
A comparison to the 1974 famine is arguably more relevant to the “Hormuz scenario” than 1943, because 1943 was a colonial crisis, while 1974 was a crisis of sovereignty, foreign exchange, and global geopolitics—the exact same pressures Bangladesh would face today.
While 1943 showed the danger of administrative apathy, 1974 provides a blueprint for how a modern state can be strangled by external economic shocks.
1. The “Foreign Exchange” Trap (The Dollar Crisis)
In 1974, Bangladesh had food in the fields, but it lacked the foreign exchange (Forex) to import grain during a shortage.
- 1974 Parallel: The government’s ability to import food commercially was exhausted because Forex reserves were depleted. This was exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis, which tripled the cost of fuel and fertilizer imports.
- Hormuz Context: A blockade would send oil prices to record highs. Bangladesh would be forced to choose between spending its dwindling dollars on LNG/Fuel (to keep the lights on and factories running) or Food. Just like in 1974, a lack of “liquidity” on the global stage could lead to a domestic supply vacuum.
2. Food as a Geopolitical Weapon (The “Cuba” Factor)
One of the most tragic aspects of 1974 was the U.S. food aid embargo.
- 1974 Parallel: The U.S. withheld food aid (under PL-480) because Bangladesh was exporting jute to Cuba, violating U.S. trade sanctions. By the time Bangladesh stopped the exports and the U.S. released the aid, it was too late to prevent mass starvation.
- Hormuz Context: In a post-Hormuz world, global food and energy markets would become hyper-politicised. Bangladesh might find its food security tied to its diplomatic alignment. If it seeks help from one “bloc” (e.g., China or India), it may face pressure or “aid conditionality” from another, mirroring the 1974 scenario where a sovereign trade decision resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe.
3. The “Anti-Famine Social Contract”
The 1974 famine was a turning point that created what scholars call an “anti-famine social contract” in Bangladesh.
- The Result: Since 1974, every Bangladeshi government has known that its political legitimacy depends on keeping the price of rice stable. The 1974 famine directly led to the fall of the post-independence government’s popularity and the eventual rise of military rule.
- Hormuz Context: A Hormuz crisis wouldn’t just be a “food problem”; it would be a stability problem. The government would likely deploy every resource—including potentially “printing money” or taking high-interest loans—to prevent a 1974-style price spike, as they know the alternative is political collapse.
| Feature | 1943 Famine | 1974 Famine | Post-Hormuz Threat |
| Primary Trigger | Wartime extraction & Apathy | Floods + Forex Crisis | Energy/Fertilizer Cost Shock |
| Role of Global Politics | British Colonial priorities | U.S. Aid Embargo (Cuba Jute) | Geopolitical Trade “Blocs” |
| Market Condition | Speculation (Boom Famine) | Price Tripling (Hyper-inflation) | Energy-driven “Stagflation” |
| Key Lesson | Admin must act early | Forex and Diplomacy matter | Energy security = Food security |
The 1974 famine proved that being self-sufficient in “production” isn’t enough. Even if Bangladesh grows enough rice, if the global price of energy makes it impossible to transport that rice or if a lack of dollars prevents the import of wheat to bridge a small gap, the system fails.
A Hormuz blockade would recreate the 1974 “perfect storm”: High global prices + Depleted reserves + Diplomatic pressure.

With the continuation of the Israel-Us war against Iran particularly along the Strait of Hormuz, we may well be seeing the end of the petrodollar era.
